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The key cryptographic protocols used to secure the internet and financial trans-
actions of today are all susceptible to attack by the development of a sufficiently
large quantum computer. One particular area at risk are cryptocurrencies, a market
currently worth over 150 billion USD. We investigate the risk of Bitcoin, and other
cryptocurrencies, to attacks by quantum computers. We find that the proof-of-work
used by Bitcoin is relatively resistant to substantial speedup by quantum computers
in the next 10 years, mainly because specialized ASIC miners are extremely fast
compared to the estimated clock speed of near-term quantum computers. On the
other hand, the elliptic curve signature scheme used by Bitcoin is much more at risk,
and could be completely broken by a quantum computer as early as 2027, by the
most optimistic estimates.
We analyze an alternative proof-of-work called Momentum, based on finding col-
lisions in a hash function, that is even more resistant to speedup by a quantum
computer. We also review the available post-quantum signature schemes to see
which one would best meet the security and efficiency requirements of blockchain
applications.
I. INTRODUCTION
Bitcoin is a decentralized digital currency secured by cryptography. Since its development
by Satoshi Nakamato in 2008 [Nak09], Bitcoin has proven to be a remarkably successful and
secure system and has inspired the development of hundreds of other cryptocurrencies and
blockchain technologies in a market currently worth over 150 billion USD.
The security of Bitcoin derives from several different features of its protocol. The first is
the proof-of-work that is required to write transactions to the Bitcoin digital ledger. The
work required to do this safeguards against malicious parties who possess less than 50% of
the computational power of the network from creating an alternative history of transactions.
The second is the cryptographic signature that is used to authorize transactions. Bitcoin
currently uses a signature scheme based on elliptic curves.
The coming development of quantum computers poses a serious threat to almost all of
the cryptography currently used to secure the internet and financial transactions, and also to
Bitcoin. In this paper, we comprehensively analyse the vulnerability of Bitcoin to quantum
attacks. We find that the proof-of-work used by Bitcoin is relatively resistant to substantial
speedup by quantum computers in the next 10 years, mainly because specialized ASIC
miners are extremely fast compared to the estimated clock speed of near-term quantum
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2computers. This means that transactions, once on the blockchain, would still be relatively
protected even in the presence of a quantum computer.
The elliptic curve signature scheme used by Bitcoin is well-known to be broken by Shor’s
algorithm [Sho99] for computing discrete logarithms. We analyse exactly how long it might
take to derive the secret key from a published public key on a future quantum computer.
This is critical in the context of Bitcoin as the main window for this attack is from the time
a transaction is broadcast until the transaction is processed into a block on the blockchain
with several blocks after it. By our most optimistic estimates, as early as 2027 a quantum
computer could exist that can break the elliptic curve signature scheme in less than 10
minutes, the block time used in Bitcoin.
We also suggest some countermeasures that can be taken to secure Bitcoin against quan-
tum attacks. We analyse an alternative proof-of-work scheme called Momentum [Lar14],
based on finding collisions in a hash function, and show that it admits even less of a quan-
tum speedup than the proof-of-work used by Bitcoin. We also review alternative signature
schemes that are believed to be quantum safe.
II. BLOCKCHAIN BASICS
In this section we give a basic overview of how bitcoin works, so that we can refer to
specific parts of the protocol when we describe possible quantum attacks. We will keep this
discussion at an abstract level, as many of the principles apply equally to other cryptocur-
rencies with the same basic structure as bitcoin.
All Bitcoin transactions are stored in a public ledger called the blockchain. Individual
transactions are bundled into blocks, and all transactions in a block are considered to have
occurred at the same time. A time ordering is placed on these transactions by placing them
in a chain. Each block in the chain (except the very first, or genesis block) has a pointer to
the block before it in the form of the hash of the previous block’s header.
Blocks are added to the chain by miners. Miners can bundle unprocessed transactions
into a block and add them to the chain by doing a proof-of-work (PoW). Bitcoin, and
many other coins, use a PoW developed by Adam Back called Hashcash [Bac02]. The
hashcash PoW is to find a well-formed block header such that h(header) ≤ t, where h is a
cryptographically secure hash function and header is the block header. A well-formed header
contains summary information of a block such as a hash derived from transactions in the
block 1, a hash of the previous block header, a time stamp, as well as a so-called nonce, a
32-bit register that can be freely chosen. An illustration of a block can be found in Table I.
The parameter t is a target value that can be changed to adjust the difficulty of the PoW.
In Bitcoin, this parameter is dynamically adjusted every 2016 blocks such that the network
takes about 10 minutes on average to solve the PoW.
In Bitcoin the hash function chosen for the proof of work is two sequential applications
of the SHA256 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}256 hash function, i.e. h(·) = SHA256(SHA256(·)). As the
size of the range of h is then 2256, the expected number of hashes that need to be tried to
accomplish the hashcash proof of work with parameter t is 2256/t. Rather than t, the Bitcoin
proof-of-work is usually specified in terms of the difficulty D where D = 2224/t. This is the
expected number of hashes needed to complete the proof of work divided by 232, the number
of available nonces. In other words, the difficulty is the expected number of variations of
1 Specifically the root of a Merkle tree of hashes of the transactions
3Version 0x20000012
Previous block header hash 00 . . . 0dfff7669865430b. . .
Merkle Root 730d68233e25bec2. . .
Timestamp 2017-08-07 02:12:18
Difficulty 860,221,984,436.22
Nonce 941660394
Transaction 1
Transaction 2
...
TABLE I. Illustration of a block. The data in the top constitutes the block header.
transactions and time stamps that need to be tried when hashing block headers, when for
each fixing of the transactions and time stamp all nonces are tried.
Miners can bundle unprocessed transactions into a block however they like, and are
awarded a number of bitcoins for succeeding in the PoW task. The “generation” transaction
paying the mining reward is also a transaction included in the block, ensuring that different
miners will be searching over disjoint block headers for a good hash pre-image.
Once a miner finds a header satsifying h(header) ≤ t, they announce this to the network
and the block is added to the chain. Note that it is easy to verify that a claimed header
satisfies the PoW condition — it simply requires one evaluation of the hash function.
The purpose of the PoW is so that one party cannot unilaterally manipulate the
blockchain in order to, for example, double spend. It is possible for the blockchain to
fork, but at any one time the protocol dictates that miners should work on the fork that is
currently the longest. Once a block has k many blocks following it in the longest chain, a
party who wants to create a longest chain not including this block would have to win a PoW
race starting k blocks behind. If the party controls much less than half of the computing
power of the network, this becomes very unlikely as k grows. In Bitcoin, a transaction is
usually considered safe once it has 6 blocks following it.
The first question we will look at in Section III A is what advantage a quantum computer
would have in performing the hashcash PoW, and if it could unilaterally “come from behind”
to manipulate the blockchain.
The second aspect of Bitcoin that is important for us is the form that transactions take.
When Bob wants to send bitcoin to Alice, Alice first creates (an ideally fresh) private-public
key pair. The public key is hashed to create an address. This address is what Alice provides
to Bob as the destination to send the bitcoin. Bitcoin uses the hash of the public key as the
address instead of the public key2 not for security reasons but simply to save space. As we
see later, this design choice does have an impact on the quantum security.
To send bitcoin to Alice, Bob must also point to transactions on the blockchain where
bitcoin was sent to addresses that he controls. The sum of bitcoin received to these referenced
transactions must add up to at least the amount of bitcoin Bob wishes to send to Alice.
Bob proves that he owns these addresses by stating the public key corresponding to each
address and using his private key corresponding to this address to sign the message saying
he is giving these bitcoins to Alice.
2 In early versions of the Bitcoin protocol the public key could be used as an address.
4III. QUANTUM ATTACKS ON BITCOIN
A. Attacks on the Bitcoin proof-of-work
In this section, we investigate the advantage a quantum computer would have in perform-
ing the hashcash PoW used by Bitcoin. Our findings can be summarized as follows: Using
Grover search [Gro96], a quantum computer can perform the hashcash PoW by performing
quadratically fewer hashes than is needed by a classical computer. However, the extreme
speed of current specialized ASIC hardware for performing the hashcash PoW, coupled with
much slower projected gate speeds for current quantum architectures, essentially negates
this quadratic speedup, at the current difficulty level, giving quantum computers no advan-
tage. Future improvements to quantum technology allowing gate speeds up to 100GHz could
allow quantum computers to solve the PoW about 100 times faster than current technology.
However, such a development is unlikely in the next decade, at which point classical hard-
ware may be much faster, and quantum technology might be so widespread that no single
quantum enabled agent could dominate the PoW problem.
We now go over these results in detail. Recall that the Bitcoin PoW task is to find a valid
block header such that h(header) ≤ t, where h(·) = SHA256(SHA256(·)). The security of
the blockchain depends on no agent being able to solve the PoW task first with probability
greater than 50%. We will investigate the amount of classical computing power that would
be needed to match one quantum computer in performing this task.
We will work in the random oracle model [BR93], and in particular assume that
Pr[h(header) ≤ t] = t/2256 where the probability is taken uniformly over all well-formed
block headers that can be created with transactions available in the pool at any given
time (such well-formed block headers can be found by varying the nonce, the transactions
included in the block as well as the least significant bits of the timestamp of the header).
On a classical computer, the expected number of block headers and nonces which need to be
hashed in order to find one whose hash value is at most t is D× 232 where D is the hashing
difficulty defined by D = 2224/t 3.
For quantum computers in the random oracle model we can restrict our attention to the
generic quantum approach to solving the PoW task using Grover’s algorithm [Gro96]. By
Grover’s algorithm, searching a database of N items for a marked item can be done with
O(
√
N) many queries to the database (whereas any classical computer would require Ω(N)
queries to complete the same task).
Let N = 2256 be the size of the range of h for the following. By our assumptions, with
probability at least 0.9999 a random set of 10 ·N/t many block headers will contain at least
one element whose hash is at most t. We can fix some deterministic function g mapping
S = {0, 1}dlog(10·N/t)e to distinct well-formed block headers. We also define a function f
which determines if a block header is “good” or not
f(x) =
{
0 if h(g(x)) > t
1 if h(g(x)) ≤ t .
A quantum computer can compute f on a superposition of inputs, i.e. perform the mapping∑
x∈S
αx|x〉 →
∑
x∈S
(−1)f(x)αx|x〉.
3 According to blockchain.info, on August 8, 2017, the hashing difficulty was D = 860 · 109 and target was
t = 2184.4
5Each application of this operation is termed an oracle call. Using Grover’s algorithm a
quantum algorithm can search through S to find a good block header by computing #O =
pi
4
√
10 ·N/t = pi214√10 ·D oracle calls. The Grover algorithm can be adapted to run with
this scaling even if the number of solutions is not known beforehand, and even if no solutions
exist [BBHT98].
While the number of oracle calls determines the number of hashes that need to be per-
formed, additional overhead will be incurred to compute each hash, construct the appro-
priate block header, and to do quantum error correction. We now analyze these factors to
determine a more realistic estimate of the running time in two ways. First, we estimate the
running time based on a well studied model for universal quantum computers with error
correction.
On a classical computer, a hash function such as SHA256 uses basic boolean gate opera-
tions, whereas on a quantum computer, these elementary boolean gates are translated into
reversible logical quantum gates which introduces some overhead. There are a total of 64
rounds of hashing in the SHA256 protocol and each round can be done using an optimized
circuit with 683 Toffoli quantum gates [PRS15]. Most quantum error correction codes use
T gates rather than Toffoli gates as the representative time consuming gate, and a careful
analysis of the cost to perform the SHA256 function call as well as the inversion about the
mean used in the Grover algorithm finds a total T gate count of 474168 for one oracle call
[SFL+13]. In that circuit decomposition, the T gates can only be parallelized by roughly a
factor of three.
There is additional overhead needed by quantum computers to perform error correction.
In deciding on a good quantum error correction code there are a variety of tradeoffs to
consider: tolerance to a particular physical error model, versatility for subroutines, number
of qubits used, logical gate complexity, and the amount of classical processing of error
syndromes and feedback. Adopting the surface code, which has advantages of a relatively
high fault tolerance error threshold and local syndrome measurements, we can adapt the
analysis in Ref. [SFL+13] to estimate the total run time of the quantum algorithm. The
time needed to run the Grover algorithm and successfully mine a block is
τ = #O ×#G/s = pi214
√
10 ·D ×#G/s,
where #G is the number of cycles needed for one oracle call, and s is the quantum computer
clock speed. Using a surface code, where the dominant time cost is in distilling magic states
to implement T gates, one finds
#G = 297784× cτ (D, pg),
where the first factor includes the logical T gate depth for calling the SHA256 function
twice as required by bitcoin PoW, and twice again to make the circuit reversible, as well as
the inversion about the mean. The second factor, cτ , is the overhead factor in time needed
for quantum error correction. It counts the number of clock cycles per logical T gate and
is a function of difficulty and the physical gate error rate pg. For a fixed gate error rate,
the overhead factor cτ is bounded above by the cost to invert a 256 bit hash (maximum
difficulty).
Because the quantum algorithm runs the hashing in superposition, there is no direct
translation of quantum computing power into a hashing rate. However, we can define an
effective hash rate, hQC, as the expected number of calls on a classical machine divided by
6pg
D
hQC (TH/s)@50GHz
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FIG. 1. Performance of a single quantum computer for blockchain attacks as a function of physical
gate error rate pg, which is an internal machine specification, and mining Difficulty D, which is
set by the blockchain protocol. (a) Effective hash rate hQC for a quantum computer operating
at 50GHz clock speed which is at the optimistic limit of forseeable clock speeds. The hash rate
increases as the square root of difficulty (note the log scale). For d quantum computers acting in
parallel the effective hash rate increases by a factor of 2.56×√d.(b) Number of physical qubits nQ
used by the quantum computer.
the expected time to find a solution on the quantum computer, viz.
hQC ≡ N/t
τ
=
0.28× s√D
cτ (D, pg)
.
Because the time overhead is bounded, asymptotically the effective hashing rate improves as
the square root of the difficulty, reflecting the quadratic advantage obtainable from quantum
processors.
The Grover algorithm can be parallelized over d quantum processors. In the optimal
strategy, each processor is dedicated to search over the entire space of potential solutions,
and the expected number of oracle calls needed to find a solution is #O = 0.39 ×#O/√d
[GWC00]. This implies an expected time to find a solution is
τ‖ = 0.39× τ/
√
d,
and the effective hash rate using d quantum processors in parallel is
hQC,‖ = 2.56× hQC
√
d.
The number of logical qubits needed in the Grover algorithm is fixed at 2402, independent
of the difficulty. The number of physical qubits needed is
nQ = 2402× cnQ(D, pg),
where cnQ is the overhead in space, i.e. physical qubits, incurred due to quantum error
correction, and is also a function of difficulty and gate error rate.
In appendix A we show how to calculate the overheads in time and space incurred by
error correction. The results showing the performance of a quantum computer for blockchain
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Hash rate of total bitcoin network vs. single quantum computer
FIG. 2. This plot shows two estimates of the hashing power (in hashes per second) of the bitcoin
network (blue striped curves) vs. a single quantum computer (red striped curves) as a function of
time for the next 25 years. We give more and less optimistic estimates and uncertainty regions
(blue and orange area). The model is described in detail in Appendices B and C. Prior to 2028
(in the more optimistic estimate) there will not be any quantum computer with sufficiently many
qubits to implement the Grover algorithm. For comparison, the black dotted line shows the hash
rate of a single ASIC device today.
attacks are given in Fig. 1. To connect these results to achievable specifications, we focus
on superconducting circuits which as of now have the fastest quantum gate speeds amoung
candidate quantum technologies and offer a promising path forward to scalability. Assuming
maximum gate speeds attainable on current devices of s = 66.7MHz [KKL+17] and assuming
an experimentally challenging, but not implausible, physical gate error rate of pg = 5×10−4,
and close to current difficulty D = 1012, the overheads are cτ = 538.6 and cnQ = 1810.7,
implying an effective hash rate of hQC = 13.8GH/s using nQ = 4.4 × 106 physical qubits.
This is more than one thousand times slower than off the shelf ASIC devices which achieve
hash rates of 14TH/s 4; the reason being the slow quantum gate speed and delays for fault
tolerant T gate construction.
Quantum technologies are posed to scale up significantly in the next decades with a
quantum version of Moore’s law likely to take over for quantum clock speeds, gate fidelities,
and qubit number. Guided by current improvements in superconducting quantum circuit
technology, forecasts for such improvements are given in Appendices B and C. This allows us
to estimate of the power of a quantum computer as a function of time as shown in Figure 2.
Evidently, it will be some time before quantum computers outcompete classical machines
for this task and when they do, a single quantum computer will not have majority hashing
power. However, even given modest improvement in power over competing miners’ classical
4 Using e.g. the AntMiner S9 available at https://asicminermarket.com
8machines, certain attacks become more profitable such as attacks on mining pools that use
smart contracts to reward pool miners to withhold their blocks [VTL17]. For example, given
the optimistic assumptions outlined in Appendix A where the effective hash rate scales like
hQC = 0.04 × s
√
D, at D = 1013 and s = 50GHz, the fractional hashing power of a group
of 20 quantum machines running in parallel relative to total hashing power is 0.1%. This
would allow for a quantum attack on pool mining with minimal bribing cost that would
reduce pool revenue by 10%.
B. Attacks on signatures
Signatures in bitcoin are made using the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm based
on the secp256k1 curve. The security of this system is based on the hardness of the Elliptic
Curve Discrete Log Problem (ECDLP). While this problem is still believed to be hard
classically, an efficient quantum algorithm to solve this problem was given by Shor [Sho99].
This algorithm means that a sufficiently large universal quantum computer can efficiently
compute the private key associated with a given public key rendering this scheme completely
insecure. The implications for bitcoin are the following:
1. (Reusing addresses) To spend bitcoin from an address the public key associated with
that address must be revealed. Once the public key is revealed in the presence of a
quantum computer the address is no longer safe and thus should never be used again.
While always using fresh addresses is already the suggested practice in Bitcoin, in
practice this is not always followed. Any address that has bitcoin and for which the
public key has been revealed is completely insecure.
2. (Processed transactions) If a transaction is made from an address which has not been
spent from before, and this transaction is placed on the blockchain with several blocks
following it, then this transaction is reasonably secure against quantum attacks. The
private key could be derived from the published public key, but as the address has
already been spent this would have to be combined with out-hashing the network
to perform a double spending attack. As we have seen in Section III A, even with a
quantum computer a double spending attack is unlikely once the transaction has many
blocks following it.
3. (Unprocessed transactions) After a transaction has been broadcast to the network,
but before it is placed on the blockchain it is at risk from a quantum attack. If
the secret key can be derived from the broadcast public key before the transaction is
placed on the blockchain, then an attacker could use this secret key to broadcast a new
transaction from the same address to his own address. If the attacker then ensures
that this new transaction is placed on the blockchain first, then he can effectively steal
all the bitcoin behind the original address.
We view item (3) as the most serious attack. To determine the seriousness of this attack
it is important to precisely estimate how much time it would take a quantum computer to
compute the ECDLP, and if this could be done in a time close to the block interval.
For an instance with a n bit prime field, a recently optimized analysis shows a quantum
computer can solve the problem using 9n+ 2dlog2(n)e+ 10 logical qubits and (448 log2(n) +
4090)n3 Toffoli gates [RNSL17]. Bitcoin uses n = 256 bit signatures so the number of Toffoli
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FIG. 3. Performance of a quantum computer operating at 10GHz clock speed for attacks on digital
signatures using the elliptic curve digital signature algorithm. (a) Time in minutes to break the
signature as a function of physical gate error rate pg. (b) Number of physical qubits used by the
quantum computer.
gates is 1.28× 1011, which can be slightly parallelized to depth 1.16× 1011. Each Toffoli can
be realized using a small circuit of T gate depth one acting on 7 qubits in parallel (including
4 ancilla qubits) [Sel13].
Following the analysis of Sec. III A, we can estimate the resources needed for a quantum
attack on the digital signatures. As with block mining, the dominant time is consumed by
distilling magic states for the logical T gates. The time to solve the ECDLP on a quantum
processor is
τ = 1.28× 1011 × cτ (pg)/s,
where the time overhead cτ now only depends on gate error rate, and s is again the clock
speed. The number of physics qubits needed is
nQ = 2334× cnQ(pg),
where the first factor is the number of logical qubits including 4 logical ancilla qubits, and
cnQ is the space overhead.
The performance of a quantum computer to attack digital signatures is given in Fig. 3.
Using a surface code with a physical gate error rate of pg = 5 × 10−4, the overhead factors
are cτ = 291.7 and cnQ = 735.3, and the time to solve the problem at 66.6 MHz clock speed
is 6.49 days using 1.7× 106 physical qubits. Looking forward to performance improvements,
for 10GHz clock speed and error rate of 10−5, the signature is cracked in 30 minutes using
485550 qubits. The latter makes the attack in item (3) quite possible and would render the
current Bitcoin system highly insecure. An estimate of the time required for a quantum
computer to break the signature scheme as a function of time is given in Figure 4, based on
the model described in Appendices B and C.
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FIG. 4. This plot shows two estimates of the time (in seconds) required for a quantum computer to
break the signature scheme (red curves) as a function of time for the next 25 years. We give more
and less optimistic estimates (red striped lines). The models are described in detail in Appendix C.
According to this estimate, the signature scheme can be broken in less than 10 minutes (600 seconds,
black dotted line) as early as 2027.
C. Future enhancements of quantum attacks
We have described attacks on the Bitcoin protocol using known quantum algorithms and
error correction schemes. While some of the estimates for quantum computing speed and
scaling may appear optimistic, it is important to keep in mind that there are several avenues
for improved performance of quantum computers to solve the aforementioned problems.
First, the assumed error correction code here is the surface code which needs significant
classical computational overhead for state distillation, error syndrome extraction, and cor-
rection. Other codes which afford transversal Clifford and non-Clifford gates could overcome
the need for slow state distillation [PR13]. In fact the slow down from classical processing
for syndrome extraction and correction could be removed entirely using a measurement free
protocol, see e.g. [PSBT10] which in a recent analysis show error thresholds [CJS16] only
about 5 times worse than the measurement heavy surface code. This could potentially
dramatically improve overall speed of error correction.
Second, reductions in logical gate counts of the quantum circuits are possible as more
efficient advanced quantum-computation techniques are being developed. For example, us-
ing a particular large-size example problem (including oracle implementations) that was
analyzed in a previous work [SVM+17], a direct comparison of the concrete gate counts,
obtained by the software package Quipper, has been achieved between the old [HHL09] and
the new [CKS15] linear-systems solving quantum algorithms, showing an improvement of
11
several orders of magnitude 5. Given that the quantum Shor and Grover algorithms have
been well studied and highly optimized, one would not expect such a dramatic improvement,
nonetheless it is likely some improvement is possible.
Third, different quantum algorithms might provide relative speedups. Recent work by
Kaliski [Kal17], presents a quantum algorithm for the Discrete Logarithm Problem: find m
given b = am, where b is a known target value and a is a known base, using queries to a so
called “magic box” subroutine which computes the most significant bit of m. By repeating
queries using judiciously chosen powers of the target value, all bits of m can be calculated
and the problem solved. Because different bits are solved one by one the problem can be
distributed to multiple quantum processors. Each processor requires a number of logical
qubits comparable to solving the entire problem, but the overall time would be reduced by
the parallelization. Furthermore, the overhead for quantum error correction is likely reduced
as the phases in the quantum fourier transform part of the circuit need not be as accurate
as in the original Shor algorithm.
IV. COUNTERMEASURES
A. Alternative proofs-of-work
As we have seen in the last section, a quantum computer can use Grover search to perform
the bitcoin proof-of-work using quadratically fewer hashes than are needed classically. In
this section we investigate alternative proofs-of-work that might offer less of a quantum
advantage. The basic properties we want from a proof-of-work are:
1. (Difficulty) The difficulty of the problem can be adjusted in accordance with the
computing power available in the network.
2. (Asymmetry) It is much easier to verify the proof-of-work has been successfully com-
pleted than to perform the proof-of-work.
3. (No quantum advantage) The proof-of-work cannot be accomplished significantly
faster with a quantum computer than with a classical computer.
The bitcoin proof-of-work accomplishes items (1),(2), but we would like to find an alternative
proof of work that does better on (3).
Similar considerations have been investigated by authors trying to find a proof-of-work
that, instead of (3) look for proofs-of-work that cannot be accelerated by ASICs. An ap-
proach to doing this is by looking at memory intensive proofs of work. Several interesting
candidates have been suggested for this such as Momentum [Lar14], based on finding colli-
sions in a hash function, Cuckoo Cycle [Tro15], based on finding constant sized subgraphs in
a random graph, and Equihash [BK17], based on the generalized birthday problem. These
are also good candidates for a more quantum resistant proof-of-work.
These schemes all build on the hashcash-style proof-of-work and use the following tem-
plate. Let h1 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n be a cryptographically secure hash function and H =
h1(header) be the hash of the block header. The goal is then to find a nonce x such that
h1(H ‖ x) ≤ t and P (H, x) ,
5 A. Scherer, personal communication
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for some predicate P . The fact that the header and nonce have to satisfy the predicate P
means that the best algorithm will no longer simply iterate through nonces x in succession.
Having a proof-of-work of this form also ensures that the parameter t can still be chosen to
vary the difficulty.
In what follows, we will analyse this template for the Momentum proof-of-work, as this
can be related to known quantum lower bounds. For the momentum proof of work, let
h2 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}` be another hash function with n ≤ `. In the original Momentum
proposal h1 can be taken as SHA-256 and h2 as a memory intensive hash function, but this
is less important for our discussion. The proof-of-work is to find H, a, b such that
h1(H ‖ a ‖ b) ≤ t and h2(H ‖ a) = h2(H ‖ b) and a, b ≤ 2` . (1)
First let’s investigate the running time in order to solve this proof-of-work, assuming that
the hash functions h1, h2 can be evaluated in unit time. Taking a subset S ⊂ {0, 1}` and
evaluating h2(H ‖ a) for all a ∈ S, we expect to find about |S|2/2` many collisions. Notice
that by using an appropriate data structure, these collisions can be found in time about |S|.
One algorithm is then as follows. For each H, we evaluate h2 on a subset S and find
about |S|2/2` many pairs a, b such that h2(H ‖ a) = h2(H ‖ b). For each collision we then
test h1(H ‖ a ‖ b) ≤ t. In expectation, we will have to perform this second test 2n/t many
times. Thus the number of H’s we will have to try is about m = max{1, 2n+`
t|S|2 }, since we have
to try at least one H. As for each H we spend time |S|, the total running time is m|S|. We
see that it is the smallest when |S| =
√
2n+`
t
, that is when m = 1, and we just try one H.
This optimal running time is then T =
√
2n+`
t
, and to achieve it we have to use a memory
of equal size to the running time, which might be prohibitive. For some smaller memory
|S| <
√
2n+`
t
the running time will be 2
n+`+1
t|S| .
Now let us look at the running time on a quantum computer. On a quantum computer
we can do the following. Call H good if there exists a, b ∈ S such that h1(H ‖ a ‖ b) ≤
t and h2(H ‖ a) = h2(H ‖ b). Testing if an H is good requires finding a collision, and
therefore necessitates at least |S|2/3 time by the quantum query lower bound of Aaronson
and Shi [AS04]. Note that this lower bound is tight as finding such a collision can also be
done in roughly |S|2/3 time using Ambainis’ element distinctness algorithm [Amb07]. We
have argued above that a set of size m = max{1, 2n+`
t|S| } is needed to find at least one good
H. By the optimality of Grover search [BBBV97] we know that we have to perform at least√
m many tests to find a good H. As testing if an H is good requires time |S|2/3, the total
running time is at least
√
m|S|2/3. As the classical running time is m|S|, we see that unlike
for the current proof of work in Bitcoin, with this proposal a quantum computer would
not be able to achieve a quadratic advantage as soon as S is more than constant size. In
particular, since
√
m|S|2/3 is minimized also when S =
√
2n+`
t
, the running time of even the
fastest quantum algorithm is at least T 2/3, which is substantially larger than T 1/2.
B. Review of post-quantum signature schemes
Many presumably quantum-safe public-key signature schemes have been proposed in
the literature. Some examples of these are hash-based signature schemes (LMS [LM95],
XMSS [BDH11], SPHINCS [BHH+15],NSW [NSW05]), code-based schemes (CFS [CFS01],
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Type Name security level (bits) PK length (kb) Sig. length (kb) PK + Sig. lengths (kb)
I.1 GPV 100 300 240 540
I.2 LYU 100 65 103 168
I.3 BLISS 128 7 5 12
I.4 DILITHIUM 138 11.8 21.6 33.4
II.1 RAINBOW 160 305 0.244 305
III.1 LMS 128 0.448 20 20.5
III.2 XMSS 128 0.544 20 20.5
III.3 SPHINCS 128 8 328 336
III.4 NSW 128 0.256 36 36
IV.1 CFS 83 9216 0.1 9216
IV.2 QUARTZ 80 568 0.128 568
TABLE II. Comparison of the public key (PK) and signature lengths of post-quantum signature
schemes in kilobits (kb). The security level given is against classical attacks. Type I are lattice
based, type II based on multivariate polynomials, type III hashing based, and type IV code based.
QUARTZ [PCG01]), schemes based on multivariate polynomials (RAINBOW [DS05]), and
lattice-based schemes (GPV [GPV08], LYU [Lyu12], BLISS [DDLL13], DILITHIUM [DLL+17],
NTRU [MBDG14]). Each of these cryptosystems have varying degree of efficiency. For a
comparison in terms of signature size and key size, see Table II.
In the blockchain context the most important parameters of a signature scheme are the
signature and public key lengths, as these must be stored in some capacity to fully verify
transactions, and the time to verify the signature. Looking at Table II, with respect the
sum of signature and public key lengths, the only reasonable options are hash and lattice
based schemes.
Hash based schemes like XMSS have the advantage of having provable security, at least
assuming the chosen hash function behaves like a random oracle. The generic quantum
attack against these schemes is to use Grover’s algorithm which means that their quantum
security level is half of the classical security level. In contrast, the best known quantum
attack against DILITHIUM at 138 bit classical security level requires time 2125. Thus at
the same level of quantum security, lattice based schemes have some advantage in signature
plus public key length.
Although the lattice based scheme BLISS has the shortest sum of signature and public
key lengths of all the schemes in Table II, there are some reasons not to choose BLISS in
practice. The security of BLISS relies on hardness of the NTRU problem and the assumption
that solving this problem is equivalent to finding a short vector in a so-called NTRU lattice.
It has been shown recently [KF17] that this assumption might be too optimistic, at least for
large parameters. Moreover, there is a history of attacks on prior NTRU-based signature
schemes [NR06, DN12]. Perhaps most fatally, BLISS is difficult to implement in a secure
way as it is very susceptible to side channel attacks. The production grade strongSwan
implementation of BLISS has been attacked in this way by Pessl et al. [PBY17], who showed
that the signing key could be recovered after observing about 6000 signature generations.
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function CalculateFactoryResources(pg, nT ) . iterates layers of error correction in
factory
ptol ← 1nT . (uncorrected) error tolerance
i← 0
while ptol < 10pg do
i← i+ 1 . add layer
di ← min
{
d ∈ N : 192d · (100pg) d+12 ≥ ptol2
}
. code distance in this layer
ptol ← (ptol70 )
1
3 . increased error tolerance
end while
layers ← i
τ ← nT · 10
∑layers
i=1 di . total clock cycles (only counts T gates)
Qfactory ← 50(dlayers)2 · 15layers−1 . total physical qubits for factory
return (τ,Qfactory)
end function
function CalculateCircuitResources(pg, nC , nL)
dC ← min
{
d ∈ N : (80pg) d+12 ≥ 1nC
}
. code distance for circuit (single layer)
return Qcircuit ← 3.125nLdC . total physical qubits for circuit
end function
TABLE III. Algorithms to compute space and time resources for quantum attacks. The inputs
are pg, the physical gate error rate; nC , the total number of Clifford gates in the logical circuit;
nT , the total number of T gates in the logical circuit; and nL, the number of logical qubits. The
outputs are τ , the time cost in number of clock cycles; and nQ = Qcircuit +Qfactory, the number of
physical qubits used for the computation including state distillation.
Appendix A: Estimating error correction resource overheads for quantum attacks
Here we describe how the overhead factors for quantum error correction are calculated
in order to obtain resource costs for quantum attacks on blockchains and digital signatures.
The method follows the analysis given in Refs. [FMMC12, MDMG+16]. We first determine
nT and nC , the number of T gates and Clifford gates respectively needed in the algorithm.
The pseudo-code to compute the overhead is given in Table III. For the blockchain attack
on nL = 2402 qubits, these values are
nT = 297784× pi214
√
10 ·D, nC = 29.4× nT .
For the Digital Signature attack on nL = 2334 qubits, the values are
6
nT = 1.28× 1011, nC = 20× nT .
If we look some years into the future we can speculate as to plausible improvements in
quantum computer technology. If we assume a quantum error correction code that supports
transversal Clifford and non-Clifford gates so there is no distillation slow down and that
it is done in a measurement free manner so that no classical error syndrome processing
6 The factor of 20 for the number of Clifford gates per T gate is based is based on the construction of T
gate depth one representations of the Toffoli gate in [Sel13].
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is necessary, then the number of cycles needed for one oracle call is determined solely by
the circuit depth which is 2142094. This is based on an overall circuit depth calculated as
follows. The oracle invokes two calls to the SHA256 hash function, and this is done twice,
once to compute it and again to uncompute it. Each hash has a reversible circuit depth of
528768. Similarly, there are two multi-controlled phase gates used, one for inversion about
the mean and one for the function call, each having a circuit depth 13511, for a total depth
4× 528768 + 2× 13511 = 2142094 (these numbers are from [SFL+13] but could be further
optimized). Then accepting potential overhead in space and physical qubit number, but
assuming no time penalty for error correction or non Clifford gate distillation, this implies
an improved effective hashing rate of
hQC = 0.04× s
√
D.
which is substantially faster. For superconducting circuits, ultrafast geometric phase
gates are possible at ∼ 50 GHz, essentially limited by the microwave resonator frequency
[RBW+12]. Using the above very optimistic assumptions, at difficulty D = 1012 the effective
hash rate would be hQC = 2.0× 103TH/s.
Appendix B: Modeling the development of bitcoin network hash rates and difficulty
The total number of hashes per second in the whole bitcoin network are taken from
blockchain.info. The data points in Figure 5(a) are the hash rates for the first of January
(2012–2015) and first of January and July (2016–2017). The two dotted curves correspond
to optimistic and less optimistic assumptions for the extrapolations. The optimistic ex-
trapolation assumes that the present growth continues exponentially for five years and then
saturates into a linear growth as the market gets saturated with fully optimized ASIC bitcoin
miners. The less optimistic assumption assume linear growth at the present rate.
From the extrapolation of the bitcoin network hashrate we can determine the difficulty
as a function of time. The expected number of hashes required to find a block in 10 minutes
(600 seconds) is given by rate(t) · 600, where rate(t) is the total hash rate displayed in
Figure 5(a). Thus the bitcoin hashing difficulty is calculated as D(t) = rate(t) · 600 · 2−32
for the two scenarios discussed above. In Figure 5(b) we compare this with values from
blockchain.info for the first of January of 2015–2017.
Appendix C: Modeling the development of quantum computers
There are several aspects of the development of quantum technologies that we must
model. Since only few data points are available at this early stage of the development
there is necessarily a lot of uncertainty in our estimates. We therefore give two different
estimates, one that is optimistic about the pace of the development and another one that
is considerably more pessimistic. Nonetheless, these predictions should be considered as a
very rough estimate and might need to be adapted in the future.
First, we need to make an assumption on the number of qubits available at any point of
time. As we focus only on solid state superconducting implementations there are only a few
data points available. We assume that the number of available qubits will grow exponentially
in time in the near future. The optimistic assumption is that the number will double every
10 months whereas the less optimistic assumption assumes the number doubles every 20
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FIG. 5. Prediction of the hash rate of the bitcoin network (in number of hashes per second) and
the hashing difficulty as a function of time.
months. These two extrapolations are plotted in Figure 6(a). The data points are taken
from the following table:
number of qubits year reference
2 2013 [CGC+13]
5 2014 [BKM+14]
3 2014 [CGM+14]
5 2016 IBM
16 2017 IBM
20 2017 [Goo]
49 2018 [Goo]
We predict that the quantum gate frequency grows exponentially for the next years. This
assumes that the classical control circuits will be sufficiently fast to control quantum gates
at this frequencies. After a couple of years the growth slows down considerably because
faster classical control circuits are necessary to further accelerate the quantum gates. We
cap the quantum gate frequency at 50 GHz (for the optimistic case) or 5 GHz (for the less
optimistic case), respectively, mostly because we expect that classical control circuits will
not be able to control the quantum gates at higher frequencies. (See, e.g., [HHOI11] for
progress in this direction.) This is shown in Figure 6(b). The data points are taken from
the following table:
gate time year reference
420ns 2013 [CGC+13]
433ns 2015 [CMS+15]
160ns 2016 [SMCG16]
42ns 2017 [DBE17]
25ns 2018 Google, projected for end of 2017
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FIG. 6. Prediction of the number of qubits, the quantum gate frequency (in gate operations per
second) and the quantum gate infidelity as a function of time. The forth plot models a reduction
of the overhead due to theoretical advances.
The predicted development of the gate infidelity is shown in Figure 6(c). We assume
that the gate infidelity will continue to drop exponentially but that this development will
stall at an infidelity of 5 · 10−6 (optimistic case) or 5 · 10−5 (less optimistic case). For the
optimistic case we expect that the gate infidelity will continue to follow DeVincenzo’s law
which predicts a reduction of the infidility by a factor of 2 per year. The data points are
taken from the following table:
gate fidelity year reference
0.9347 2013 [CGC+13]
0.96 2014 [CGM+14]
0.97 2015 [CMS+15]
0.99 2016 [SMCG16]
0.995 2017 [Goo]
0.997 2018 [Goo]
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Finally, we assume that the number of qubits and time steps required by any algorithm
will be reduced over time for two reasons. First, the gate fidelity will increase over time and
thus allow for more efficient fault-tolerant schemes to be used. Second, theoretical advances
will allow to decrease the number of qubits and gates required to implement the algorithm
and fault-tolerant schemes. We expect that this factor will be overhead(t) = βt−2017 where
β ∈ {0.75, 0.85} for optimistic and less optimistic assumptions, respectively.
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